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Journal of the West

OWHERE is drought a more common feature
of the American landscape than in the West.
Droughts are well documented in the region's
climatic record, and extended drought periods are indicated in tree rings and other surrogates of climate. When
settlers headed west in the middle of the 19th century,
the high cost of those droughts began to be recorded as
well. Coupled with drought occurrence have been
repeated attempts to relieve the suffering and devastation caused by the most severe drought episodes.
The history of drought relief in the West, and ultimately the entire United States, began with the private
sector and gradually moved to the government, especially the federal government. It is a history characterized
by short-term, crisis-oriented approaches rather than by
planning and proactive measures. Drought relief typically has been viewed as something to be dispensed after
the event, and only to ameliorate drought's impacts. It
was not until the mid-1930s that the idea of reducing
vulnerability to drought was even voiced, and the concept has made uneven progress since then.
Severe drought events since the mid-to-late-1980s,
particularly in the western United States, have raised
awareness of this continuing vulnerability. The West
experienced a devastating series of drought years from
1986 to 1992, with California and Nevada experiencing
seven and six consecutive years of drought, respectively.
Drought returned to much of the West in 1994 and has
repeated each year in at least a po1tion of the region. In
1996, large sections of the Southwest, Great Basin, and
central and southern Great Plains were affected.
Widespread drought returned to the region in 1998,
1999, and 2000, once again resulting in serious economic, social, and environmental consequences. The
escalating costs and heightened awareness of these
drought impacts emphasize that we have not yet made
the transition to proactive drought management with a
focus on preparedness and mitigation.
If we are to make progress in preparing for and mitigating the effects of future drought, we must develop a
better understanding of its characteristics (i.e., frequency, severity, and patterns). It is equally important to
develop a better understanding of who and what is most
at risk and what actions can be taken to reduce the risk
from future drought events. In the West, increasing and

N

shifting population is placing greater pressure on water
and other natural resources, but government policies do
not always promote wise management of those resources. One fact is clear: continuing to address drought
impacts through government-sponsored emergency
assistance programs will not decrease the vulnerability
of the West or other portions of the United States to
future drought events. Reducing the risk of drought for
future generations requires greater investments in preparedness and mitigation.
In discussing the history of drought and relief efforts
in the West during the settlement and post-settlement
periods, as well as current trends in drought management, emphasis will be given to the West. However, resolution of drought management planning and policy
issues must also be addressed at the national, state, and
local levels. Drought's impacts are distinctly regional in
nature, but drought affects virtually all areas of the
nation. Improving drought management will require a
coordinated effort among local, state, federal, and tribal
governments.
Drought Relief in the 19th and 20th Centuries
The settlers who populated the Great Plains and other
parts of the West after 1850 had little prior knowledge of
the area's climate. Several expeditions had explored the
region, but the information they gathered was primarily
for the government, not the general public, 1 and "boosters" of the region provided glowing but inaccurate accounts of the Great Plains' agricultural potential. Most
settlers had little money and few possessions, and their
farming experience was acquired in the more humid
East, so the crops and cultivation practices they chose
were not necessarily compatible with the Great Plains
environment. Because the earliest settlements occurred
during a wet cycle, however, these shortcomings were
not immediately apparent. When the inevitable droughts
and harsh winters occurred, economic hardship and human suffering immediately followed. Just as quickly, it
seemed, the early settlers forgot the lessons learned once
the rains returned. Although adverse conditions forced
many settlers to return to the Eastern United States,
many more continued to push west, and the idea that the
climate of the Great Plains was changing, particularly in
response to human settlement, was popularly accepted.
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It was not until the last years of the 19th century that this

idea was abandoned and more realistic agricultural
options were explored. 2 In the interim, repeated droughts
tested the settlers and the ingenuity of local and state
governments that were struggling to survive.
For a variety of reasons, drought relief came primarily from private organizations in the 19th century, and it
was not universally accepted. Government, particularly
federal, and those who stood to gain financially from
settlement of the Great Plains were generally opposed to
relief efforts. Many people had much at stake in the
newly settled Great Plains and were afraid that reports of
drought distress would filter back East and discourage
immigration. Because of this, news about famine was
often suppressed, and it was private interests that provided some of the earliest drought relief, via an organization known as the Territorial Relief Committee in
Kansas in the early 1860s. 3 The federal government,
despite its negative view of providing aid, did have some
direct involvement in drought relief. In 1875, the newly
formed Nebraska State Relief and Aid Society received
congressional approval to distribute Army surplus clothing and food to more than 100,000 persons in Minnesota, Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado. 4 In
general, however, the federal government did not regard
drought relief as a federal responsibility; this was made
clear when President Grover Cleveland vetoed a con-
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gressional appropriation for seed for drought-stricken
Texas in 1887 on the grounds that the government had
neither the power nor the duty to provide relief and that
to do so would weaken character. 5
Territorial, state, and local governments found themselves in a difficult situation. They had a great stake in
attracting more settlers, because a greater number of
people meant economic resources and the ability to exploit the natural wealth of the region. 6 Although state
and territorial Legislatures often rejected direct relief
measures, they could not escape providing aid altogether - usually in the form of funds for either seed grains
or for payment of freight charges for bringing items collected through private relief. But it was clear that private
charity was still a major component of relief efforts
toward the end of the 19th century. In Nebraska and
Colorado, many settlers received privately donated supplies worth thousands of dollars, and Nebraska's State
Relief Commission collected cash donations of about
$29,000 in 1895. 7
The federal government made its first drought disaster loans during the Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge administrations, beginning with a 1918 measure providing $5 million to farmers for seed loans. 8 When the
severe droughts of the 1930s struck, President Herbert Hoover's administration also authorized federal expenditures, but Hoover's initial approach essentially

Hungry Horse Reservoir, Montana, May 1988, with water levels showing the effects of the dry 1987-1988 winter.

Photo by Donald Wilhite
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emphasized the 19th-century tradition of nongovernment relief and voluntary contributions. In December
1930, Hoover persuaded the Red Cross to direct drought
relief measures, although its involvement was not on the
large scale that the President had envisioned. 9 The severity of the drought, however, finally forced the federal
government into the relief picture, and the President
i! eventually supported bills providing funds for crop production loans as well as feed and seed loans. 10 The
:<! Hoover administration marked the end of the "self-help"
~ approach to drought.
~
The early years of the Roosevelt administration repP-"'
~ resented a major turning point in federal drought-relief
~ efforts. Federal involvement increased dramatically:
c: more than $500 million was appropriated for drought
Oil:
g relief in 1934, 11 and the federal government assumed
Si: complete authority for drought relief. A more compre~ hensive federal drought-relief organization was <level~. oped to deal with problems of distress; this included the
EW··· development of procedures for drought disaster-area
designation and numerous drought response/planning
activities. Numerous long-term measures, such as the
consolidation of soil programs under a single agency
(the Soil Conservation Service) and the Shelterbelt
Project, also were implemented during the Roosevelt
administration to reduce the vulnerability of the Great
Plains to future droughts.
Drought once again plagued the Great Plains in the
1950s. The Eisenhower administration reluctantly
became involved in a drought-relief program; 12 the
President's advisors suggested that he follow the precedent set by Grover Cleveland in 1887, when Cleveland
vetoed the congressional appropriation for drought relief
in Texas. But the precedent set by Roosevelt was too
strong for Eisenhower to ignore completely. Instead, the

1

October

Eisenhower administration emphasized that states
should share the cost of relief measures and that local
and state government should assume a greater role in
relieving hardships created by drought. Federal participation would occur only as a supplement to local resources, and the President stressed the importance of
research and long-range programs to stabilize the economy of areas frequently affected by severe drought. By
the end of the 1950s drought, federal expenditures for
emergency and short-term measures totaled an estimated $1 to $1.5 billion; the government had also begun
long-term programs like the Great Plains Conservation
Program (authorized in 1958), various economic assistance programs, industrial development (to diversify the
drought region's economy), and water resources planning.13
Although the drought of the 1974-1977 period in the
United States was widespread and severe, it was not
comparable to the 1930s or the 1950s droughts in intensity, duration, or spatial extent for most of the nation. Its
most serious impacts were experienced in the Far West
and Upper Midwest states. During the Ford administration, no new programs were developed and no coordinated effort was initiated to respond to deteriorating
conditions. In January 1977, as the Carter administration took office, states began to form regional alliances
to put political pressure on Washington for action. Governors of Western states met with Interior Secretary
Cecil Andrus to discuss needs and federal actions to
mitigate drought impact; it was the first joint discussion of mitigation alternatives by state and federal officials.
In response, the Carter administration created a presidential drought package that provided $844 million in
loans and grants to farmers, ranchers, communities, and
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President Jimmy Carter's Proposed Drought Program, March 23, 1977*
Title

Purpose/Description

Amount

Emergency Loans Program
(Farmers Home Administration)

5% loans to cover prospective losses to
farmers and ranchers

$100,000,000

Community Program Loans
(Farmers Home Administration)

$150 million in 5% loans and $75 million in
grants to communities of less than 10,000
for emergency water supplies

$225,000,000

Emergency Conservation
Measures Program
(Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service)

Soil conservation cost-sharing grants

$100,000,000

FCIC Insurance (Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation)

Increase FCIC capital stock

$100,000,000

Drought Emergency Program
(Bureau of Reclamation)

Creation of water bank, protection of fish
and wildlife, grants to states, 5% for water
supply and conservation measures

$100,000,000

Emergency Fund
(Bureau of Reclamation)

Emergency irrigation loans

$30,000,000

Emergency Power
(Southwest Power Administration)

Purchase of emergency power supply

$14,000,000

Community Emergency
Drought-Relief Program
(Economic Development Administration)

$150 million in 5% loans and $75 million in
grants to communities of more than 10,000
for emergency water supply

$225,000,000**

Physical Loss and Economic Injury
Loans (Small Business Administration)

Low-interest loans for small businessmen
(including farmers)

$50,000,000***

TOTAL

Amount Requested
Amount Appropriated

$944,000,000
$844,000,000

* Cited in Managing Resource Scarcity: Lessons from the Mid-Seventies Drought, Western Governors' Policy Office, Denver, CO.
** Only $175 million of this amount was finally appropriated.
*** Action on this proposal resulted in the lowering of interest rates for Physical Loss and Economic Injury Loans (both ongoing,
funded programs), but none of the additional appropriation originally requested was granted.

businesses stricken by drought. Yet this package was
only a small portion of the total drought assistance
program. The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
and Interior and the Small Business Administration
administered more than $5 billion in drought-relief programs to water users during 1976-1977. 14
The processes for distributing these funds proved
complex and confusing. The General Accounting
Office, in a study of the 1976-1977 federal drought
response effort, identified several of the problems: programs enacted too late to lessen the effects of drought;
inconsistent, inequitable, and confusing program
requirements; and inadequate coordination among agencies, which led to program overlap and nonuniform standards. The GAO report recommended that a national

drought plan be developed to provide assistance in a
more timely, consistent, and equitable manner.
The 1987-1989 drought period was costly, incurring
total losses during 1988 of $39 billion, according to the
Interagency Drought Policy Committee. 15 By 1988,
drought was widespread across most of the West, northern Great Plains, Midwest, and Southeast. Once again
government agencies responded through a reactive crisis
management approach. In 1988, many of the agencies
responsible for monitoring climate-sensitive resources
apparently were not prepared and did not recognize the
serious nature of the drought early enough. 16 Most agencies did not begin to respond to the drought until midsummer, and it was not until late June or early July 1988
that the federal government began a response effort.
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Existing U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) disaster assistance programs were modified and elaborated,
and an emergency feed program was implemented. By
August, the need for additional assistance, beyond those
programs already in existence, led Congress to pass the
Disaster Assistance Act of 1988; the cost of this legislation, which provided further assistance to livestock producers, was estimated at $3 .9 billion. 17
This response effort did address the worst of the
drought's impacts, but its activities were reactionary in
nature, and the general lack of coordination and planning caused problems. In their study of the impacts of
the 1987-1989 drought, W. E. Riebsame, et al., 18 suggested the development of a better drought watch system, an evaluation of drought indices, the development
and application of climate-impact models in a coordinated fashion, and new contingency plans for critical
resource systems as means of improving droughtresponse efforts.
Since 1994, drought has been a common feature of
the Western landscape. The period from 1995 to 2000, in
particular, has been characterized by dramatic and complex economic, social, and environmental impacts
throughout the nation. 19 In 1995, a severe drought developed in portions of western Texas and New Mexico, carrying over into 1996 in these states and expanding into
Arizona, central and eastern Texas, and parts of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas.
Impacts included range fires, with Colorado alone experiencing nearly 68,000 fires over more than 2 million
acres; 20 depleted groundwater supplies, resulting in
water-use restrictions in cities across the region; agricultural losses, estimated at $5 billion in Texas alone; 21 and
decreased ski resort revenues. Food prices in turn responded to the lower production levels for milk, meat,
produce, and other foodstuffs; 22 the price of fruit, for
example, increased more than 22 percent in June. Environmental damages also began to emerge as endangered
species were affected and landscapes were eroded. 23
There are no official estimates of the total losses and
damages from the 1996 drought, but given the $5 billion
in impacts that occurred in Texas, total regional impacts
could be safely estimated in the $10 to $15 billion range,
although this figure does not include social and environmental impacts, which are difficult to quantify. What
was remarkable was the significant level of regional vulnerability, the diversity of impacts, and the lack of preparedness to respond to these impacts. Many of the
states in this region have now initiated longer-term
planning efforts directed at improving mitigation and
preparedness efforts: New Mexico and Oklahoma developed drought plans, Texas and Arizona initiated planning efforts, and Utah revised an existing drought plan.
Future Directions for
Drought Management in the United States
The legacy of the 1996 drought is not likely to be its

impacts but rather the policy initiatives that occurred in
the post-drought period. These initiatives appear to be
changing the way droughts are viewed, and they may
change the way droughts are managed in the United
States. The real question at this point is whether these
changes will result in permanent and substantive modifications in the way government entities deal with
drought.
In June 1996, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) was asked to chair a multi-state
drought task force to address the drought situation in the
Southwest and southern Great Plains states. The purpose
of the task force was to coordinate federal response to
drought-related problems in the stricken region by identifying needs, applicable programs, and program barriers. The task force was also directed to suggest ways to
improve drought management through both short- and
long-term national actions. The final report of this task
force contained several important long-term recommendations. 24 First, the task force called for the development
of a national drought policy based on the philosophy of
cooperation with state and local stakeholders. This policy should include a national climate/drought monitoring system to provide early warning of the onset and
severity of drought to federal, state, and local officials.
Second, it was suggested that a regional forum be
created to assess regional needs and resources, identify
critical areas and interests, provide reliable and timely
information, and coordinate state actions. Third, FEMA
was asked to include drought as one of the natural hazards addressed in the National Mitigation Strategy,25
given the substantial costs associated with its occurrence
and the numerous opportunities available to mitigate its
effects. FEMA's 1995 report had estimated annual losses
due to drought at $6 to $8 billion. Fourth, states strongly requested that a single federal agency be appointed to
coordinate drought preparedness and response and that
FEMA be given this responsibility. FEMA suggested
that the USDA be the agency in charge, given its program responsibilities in agriculture, often the first sector
affected.
Another important initiative resulting from the 1996
drought was the development of a drought task force
under the leadership of the Western Governors' Association (WGA). This task force was formed in June 1996
as a result of a resolution offered by Governor Gary
Johnson of New Mexico that emphasized the importance
of a comprehensive, integrated drought response. 26 The
WGA Drought Task Force's report made several important recommendations. First, a national drought policy
or framework should be developed that integrates
actions and responsibilities among all levels of government and emphasizes preparedness, response, and mitigation measures. Second, each state should be encouraged to develop a drought contingency plan that includes early warning, triggers, and short- and long-term
planning, and mitigation measures. Third, a regional

Wilhite and Wood: Revisiting Drought Relief and Management Efforts in the West

JOW, Summer 2001, Vol. 40, No. 3

23

Status of Drought Planning, January 2001

m States with plans emphasizing response
•

D
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States with plans emphasizing mitigation
States developing long-term plans
States delegating drought planning to local authorities
States without drought plans

Status of state drought plans, January 2001. To date, 30 states have drought plans, with another 6 states at various stages of plan development. Of the 30 with plans, most emphasize response; 3 states have plans that emphasize mitigation. (Map based on surveys of state agencies conducted by the National Drought Mitigation Center at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.)

drought coordinating council should be created to develop sustainable policy, monitor drought conditions,
assess state-level responses, identify impacts and issues
for resolution, and work in partnership with the federal
government to address drought-related needs. Fourth, a
federal interagency coordinating group should be established with a designated lead agency for drought coordination with states and regional agencies.
A number of important policy initiatives have resulted from the FEMA and WGA reports. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed in early 1997
between the WGA and the Departments of Agriculture,
Interior, and Commerce; FEMA; and the Small Business
Administration, calling for a partnership among federal,
state, local, and tribal governments to reduce drought
impacts in the Western United States. This MOU resulted in the following actions: (1) the Western Drought
Coordination Council (WDCC) was formed to address
the recommendations of the Western governors; 27 (2)

USDA was designated as the lead federal agency for
drought to carry out the objectives of the MOU; and (3)
USDA established a federal interagency drought coordinating group.
Another initiative of considerable relevance was the
reexamination of Western water policy by the Western
Water Policy Review Advisory Commission. This
Commission was created by the passage of the Western
Water Policy Act of 1992 by the U.S. Congress (Public
Law 102-575). One of the reports of this Commission
summarized recommendations from recent studies on
drought management that should be incorporated in
future attempts to integrate drought management and
water policy in the West. 28 The consensus from the
reports reviewed in this study emphasized the need to
create a national drought policy and plan, develop a
national climate-monitoring system, incorporate
drought in FEMA's National Drought Mitigation
Strategy, conduct post-drought audits of federal/state
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response efforts, establish regional drought forums, and
encourage development of state drought mitigation
plans. Although impacts of drought occur mainly at the
local, state, and regional levels, this study concluded that
it was imperative for the federal government to provide
the leadership necessary to improve the way the nation
prepares for and responds to drought.
The National Drought Policy Act of 1998 was passed
by Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton in July
1998 (Public Law 105-199). This bill created the
National Drought Policy Commission (NDPC) whose
task was to make recommendations to the President and
Congress on the development of a national drought policy. The NDPC's report recommended that the United
States establish a national drought policy emphasizing
preparedness. 29 The goals of this policy would be to (1)
incorporate planning, proactive mitigation measures,
risk management, resource stewardship, environmental
considerations, and public education; (2) improve collaboration among scientists and managers to enhance
observation networks, monitoring, prediction, information delivery, and applied research and to foster public
understanding of and preparedness for drought; (3)
incorporate comprehensive insurance and financial
strategies into drought preparedness plans; (4) maintain
a safety net of emergency relief that emphasizes sound
stewardship of natural resources and self-help; and (5)
coordinate drought programs and resources. At this writing, the recommendations of the NDPC report are under
consideration.
Actions taken since 1996 to improve drought management in the United States have had little effect so far
- especially at the federal level, as verified by the federal response to drought conditions in 1999 and 2000.
Instead, it has been the states that have been progressive
in the past two decades in drought-plan development: 30
states have drought plans and another 6 states are at various stages of plan development. Since 1996, some
states have revised or developed drought plans that place
more emphasis on mitigation. Federal agencies are now
speaking the new language of drought management, and
phrases like "improved coordination and cooperation,"
"increased emphasis on mitigation and preparedness,"
and "building nonfederal/federal partnerships" have
become commonplace. However, the existing federal
emergency response infrastructure encourages drought
management to remain in a reactive crisis management
mode, and the mentality of both state and federal government clearly remains response oriented. Whether
federal and state policymakers clearly understand the
scope of the changes that will be required to invoke the
new paradigm of risk management is not apparent at this
time. When drought conditions exist, especially in election years, drought relief is one method that members of
Congress use to send money home to their constituents.
The true test of whether we are making progress will be
if Congress and the administration enthusiastically

embrace the recommendations of the NDPC and other
groups, provide adequate funding to support the NDPC
goals and recommendations, and direct federal agencies
to modify existing policies and programs to emphasize
mitigation and preparedness, thus effectively shifting
funding from crisis to risk management.
Conclusions
Drought, a normal part of the climate for virtually all
regions of the United States, is an even more common
menace in the West. Likewise, drought relief has
become a common feature of the Western (and national)
landscape. Shaped over the course of the past century
and a half, this relief occurs primarily under a diverse,
complex, confusing, and poorly coordinated ensemble
of federal programs. It is reactive and does little to
lessen the risks associated with future drought episodes.
The wide-ranging and complex web of impacts associated with drought clearly indicate land and agricultural
resource management practices that are nonsustainable
in the long term, especially given the variable climate of
the region.
In the past several decades, there have been numerous
calls for increased attention to drought planning and a
reduced emphasis on government-sponsored emergency
assistance programs. The frustration over the complexity of impacts and our inability to respond effectively to
recent drought events has only served to fuel these calls
for action. The new paradigm - shifting from crisis to
risk management - has been received with varying
degrees of acceptance by state and federal agencies.
Only time will determine the dedication of the nation to
this new approach to drought management. A continuation of widespread, severe drought in the next few years
would certainly engender greater support for this new
paradigm. The political will to change the way we manage drought appears to be genuine, but may evaporate
quickly if a series of wet years occurs. Changing the
momentum of the past will be a difficult obstacle to
overcome, but it is critical for the scientific community
and the public to hold policymakers to this commitment.
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